Praise be to Allah, and may peace and blessings be upon the Messenger of Allah.
Writing may take the place of verbal expression in some family-law matters when accompanied by intention, such as divorce, zihār, and khulʿ. However, matters that are oaths and which cannot be established through indirect wording, such as liʿān and īlāʾ, are not valid through writing. As for faskh (dissolution of the marriage), it is not merely a statement or written formula; rather, it is a legal ruling that results from its prescribed causes.
If the husband writes a divorce statement without verbally pronouncing it, divorce does not take effect merely by writing without intention, because writing in this case is considered an indirect expression of divorce, rather than an explicit statement.
If the husband intends by writing to effect divorce, then divorce takes effect according to the established details of the rulings concerning divorce.
Zihār by writing follows the same ruling as divorce in this matter. It does not take effect merely by writing without intention.
If the husband writes words indicating zihār and intends by them to initiate zihār, the writing is considered to take the place of verbal expression. However, if he writes them without intending to initiate zihār, zihār does not take effect.
It is stated in al-Hāwī al-Kabīr (10/169):
“As for zihār by writing, it is like divorce according to two views.”
As for īlāʾ by writing, it is not valid, because it is an oath, and an oath is not established through indirect wording.
Khulʿ is likewise valid in writing when accompanied by intention. Writing that is not intended to initiate khulʿ, however, does not result in khulʿ.
It is stated in Nihāyat al-Muhtāj (6/407), when explaining what constitutes khulʿ:
“Writing, when accompanied by intention, takes the place of verbal expression.”
Therefore, what matters in written khulʿ is the intention to initiate khulʿ, not merely the presence of the written words.
As for liʿān, it is not valid through writing because it is an oath, and oaths are not established through indirect wording.
Scholars have previously stated that īlāʾ is not valid through writing because its essence is an oath by Allah, and liʿān is likewise based upon solemn oaths between the spouses when a husband accuses his wife of adultery without having the required evidence.
Therefore, writing alone is insufficient. Rather, liʿān must be carried out in the legally prescribed manner.
As for faskh (dissolution of the marriage), it is not merely a formula initiated by the husband through writing in the same way as divorce or khulʿ. Rather, it is a legal ruling that results when a legally recognized cause for dissolution exists, such as a recognized defect, the conversion to Islam of one of the spouses in certain circumstances, or failure to fulfill a valid condition stipulated in the marriage contract.
Therefore, faskh cannot be included under the same ruling concerning writing and verbal expression that applies to divorce, zihār, or khulʿ.
Writing accompanied by intention takes the place of verbal expression in divorce, zihār, and khulʿ, according to the relevant details of Islamic jurisprudence. Writing without intention does not produce these effects. As for liʿān and īlāʾ, they are not valid through writing because they are oaths that are not established through indirect wording. Faskh, on the other hand, is a legal ruling resulting from its prescribed causes, rather than merely a verbal or written formula.